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CADAVER DONORS ARE THE BEST SOLUTION TO
THE ORGAN SHORTAGE
Raymond Pollak*
Organ transplantation was once an experimental therapy. Today,
due to modern immune suppressive drugs, it is an established clinical
practice that has caused exponential growth in the waiting list of po-
tential transplant recipients.' This list now numbers over 90,000 in the
United States alone.2
These drugs have also boosted the demand for organs that are de-
rived from altruistic living and cadaver donors. But living donors can-
not fully meet this demand, nor can they provide organs such as the
heart. As a result, transplantation must rely on the available pool of
medically suitable cadaver donors-donors who are brain dead or
have lost their heartbeat.
* Raymond Pollak, M.D., is the Professor and Surgical Director of the Abdominal Organ
Transplant Program at the University of Illinois College of Medicine at Peoria and the OSF Saint
Francis Medical Center. He has had a distinguished academic and clinical career in the Depart-
ment of Surgery at the University of Illinois in Chicago, where he led the multiorgan abdominal
transplant program for ten years. Dr. Pollak is a native of the Republic of South Africa and
graduated from the University of the Witwatersrand Medical School in Johannesburg. Follow-
ing a rotating internship and military service, he completed his residency training in general
surgery at the University of Illinois Hospitals and Clinics in Chicago. Thereafter, he was a Pil-
sbury Fellow in the Department of Immunology and went on to train in transplantation surgery
at the University of Illinois Hospital and Presbyterian Hospital in Pittsburgh. He was then ap-
pointed to the faculty of the University of Illinois College of Medicine in Chicago and was soon
promoted to the tenured rank of full Professor of Surgery. Dr. Pollak has published over 150
scholarly works in the field of transplantation and has been the Principal Investigator for a num-
ber of industry-sponsored drug trials in transplantation. He has also received substantial funding
from the National Institutes of Health for basic science research in transplantation. He has
received numerous teaching awards from medical students and surgical residents and has lec-
tured nationally and internationally. Dr. Pollak's leadership in transplantation has been recog-
nized by elected positions to the board of the United Network for Organ Sharing, representing
Region 7 as well as the Board of Directors of the Regional Organ Bank of Illinois. He is also a
member and officer of important peer-reviewed societies in surgery and transplantation.
1. See United Network for Organ Sharing, UNOS Facts and Figures, http://www.unos.org/
Resources/factsheets.asp?fs=5 (last visited Mar. 3, 2006).
2. Id.
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Regrettably, there is also a shortage of cadaver organ donors. Fam-
ily refusal, religious beliefs, superstition, and ignorance contribute to
the dearth of cadaver organ donors.3
A greater problem, however, is public mistrust. The organ alloca-
tion system must satisfy three principles: equity, justice, and utility.
These principles, articulated by ethicists such as Arthur Caplan of the
University of Pennsylvania, stress that waiting recipients must have an
equal chance to receive a donated organ (the principle of equity), that
the most deserving patient must have first priority (the principle of
justice), and that the best use must be made of the donated "gift of
life" (the principle of utility). 4
When avaricious transplant programs subvert these principles, they
damage the overall effort to encourage voluntary organ donation. To
paraphrase Dr. Caplan: "Fairness in allocation drives donation. ' 5
The failure of altruism alone to encourage greater numbers of both
live and cadaver donations has prompted suggestions for government-
funded incentives. These incentives include payment for the funeral
expenses of cadaver donors, waiving donors' income or estate taxes,
or awarding them compensation and a medal. 6
Some have gone further and have advocated a free market ap-
proach that treats organs as tradable commodities whose value is set
by the laws of supply and demand.7 Despite legal proscriptions
against this approach in a number of countries (including the United
States),8 the illicit trade in organs is active in several places. 9 Recent
media reports have described organ peddling rings in Israel and South
3. See generally S. Corlett, Public Attitudes Toward Human Organ Donation, 17 TRANSPLAN-
TION PROC. 103 (6 Supp. 3, 1985); A. K. Gordon et a]., Surveying Donor Families: A Comparison
of Two Organ Procurement Organizations, 9 CLINICAL TRANSPLANTATION 141 (1995).
4. See generally A. L. Caplan, Problems in the Policies and Criteria Used to Allocate Organs
for Transplantation in the United States, 21 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 3381 (1989).
5. Id. at 3387.
6. Robert Arnold et al., Financial Incentives for Cadaver Organ Donation: An Ethical Reap-
praisal, 73 TRANSPLANTATION 1361 (2002); Paul Terasaki, Letter, A Congressional Gold Medal
for Transplant Donors and Families, 5 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 1167 (2005).
7. Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs: The Virtues of a Futures Mar-
ket, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1989); L.R. Cohen, A Futures Market in Cadaveric Organs:
Would It Work?, 25 TRANSPLANTION PROC. 60, 61 (1995).
8. National Organ Transplantation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274e (2000). 42 U.S.C. § 274e be-
gins: "It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any
human organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects
interstate commerce." Id. § 274e(a).
9. Brian Handwerk, Organ Shortage Fuels Illicit Trade in Human Parts, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC
ULTIMATE EXPLORER, Jan. 16, 2004, available at http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2004/
01/0116_040116_EXPLorgantraffic.html.
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Africa that induced poor Romanians and Brazilians, respectively, to
sell their kidneys for meager sums.10
Many associations that represent the "transplant community" of
healthcare professionals have denounced the buying and selling of or-
gans for profit and have threatened sanctions against their members
who engage in these practices.11 They note that organs are primarily
bought from the poor, who have little recourse if they suffer any ad-
verse consequences from the donation.' 2
The often desperate and vulnerable recipients of organs are also
victims. They are required to pay exorbitant sums to acquire an or-
gan, with few safeguards as to the bona fides of the surgeons and phy-
sicians involved or the quality of the organ to be transplanted.' 3 The
medical literature is peppered with individual case reports of recipi-
ents who acquired a disease or experienced a near fatal outcome from
a transplant procedure that involved an organ from a paid donor. 14
The free market in organs may also encourage criminal activity,
providing credence to the oft-quoted myth of innocents being drugged
and abducted only to wake up the next morning in a hotel room with a
new flank incision and a missing kidney. Worst of all is the ghoulish
specter of physicians becoming complicit in these schemes, undermin-
ing the public's already fragile trust in the emergency care of seriously
injured patients.' 5
What, then, are the potential solutions to the shortage of transplant-
able organs that will be legal, ethical, and acceptable to the public?
The expansion of voluntary live donor programs is one approach.
But critics point out that live donation is the one circumstance in
medicine where a human being is subjected to a potentially mortal
10. Id.; see also Fred Kockot, Kidney Scandal: Call for Changes to Law, SUNDAY TRIB., Sept.
25, 2005, available at www.sundaytribune.co.za/index.php?Setld=109&fSectionId=160&fArticle
Id=2890033.
11. See Commercialisation in Transplantation: The Problems and Some Guidelines for Prac-
tice, 2 LANCET 715 (1985).
12. Id.
13. Handwerk, supra note 9.
14. See, e.g., Andis Robeznieks, Man Who Got Transplant After Ads Dies, AM. MED. NEWS,
May 16, 2005; A.K. Salahudeen et al., High Mortality Among Recipients of Bought Living- Unre-
lated Donor Kidneys, 336 LANCET 725 (1990); T.E. Starzl, Living Donors: Con, 19 TRANSPLAN-
TATION PROC. 174, 174-75 (1987).
15. See generally Silke V. Haustein & Marty T. Sellers, Factors Associated With
(Un)willingness to Be an Organ Donor: Importance of Public Exposure and Knowledge, 18
CLINICAL TRANSPLANTATION 193 (2004).
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surgical procedure for no personal medical benefit. That is a violation
of the Hippocratic admonition to "first do no harm."' 16
The possibility of using xenografts-organs removed from geneti-
cally altered animals-remains in the realm of experimental trans-
plantation and is mired in concerns that unknown, new diseases will
emerge from these operations. 17 The use of cloning technologies to
provide organs for transplantation is similarly handicapped by politi-
cal considerations. 18
The use of the internet and billboards on public highways to adver-
tise the need of single individuals who plead for directed organ dona-
tions has also gained the attention of the public and policymakers. 19
The potential for chaos in the organ donor allocation system in the
United States has been highlighted as a result of these well-publicized
pleas for donated organs through the medium of advertising. 20 Once
rare, these kinds of solicitations are becoming more common as in-
creasing numbers of patients wait for longer periods of time for the
gift of a life-saving organ.21
But curtailing the rights of patients to advertise and discuss their
plight in the media raises important First Amendment issues. This
conduct also begs the question as to whether other waiting, equally
deserving patients should be given equal time, as it were, in order not
to be disenfranchised and excluded from the donor pool.22
Then there is the issue of affordability-will those who can afford
the costs of advertising and who are media savvy gain an unfair advan-
tage? 23 This may well be the case and result in organs going preferen-
tially to the wealthy-again a violation of the public mandate and
trust implicit in altruistic organ donation. 24
16. See, e.g., Thomas E. Starzl, Will Live Organ Donations No Longer Be Justified?, 15 HAS-
TINGS CTR. REPS. 5 (1985).
17. Jay A. Fishman & Clive Patience, Xenotransplantation: Infectious Risk Revisited, 4 AM. J.
TRANSPLANTATION 1383, 1383-88 (2004); see also L.E. Chapman, Xenotransplantation: Public
Health Risks-Patient vs. Society in an Emerging Field, 278 CURRENT Topics IN MICROBIOLOGY
& IMMUNOLOGY 23 (2003).
18. Stephen S. Hall, The Recycled Generation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2000, (Magazine), at 30;
Andrew Pollack, The Promise in Selling Stem Cells, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2001, at BUL.
19. See, e.g., Matching Donors, www.matchingdonors.com (last visited Mar. 9, 2006).
20. See generally Robert Steinbrook, Public Solicitation of Organ Donors, 353 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 441 (2005).
21. See id. at 441.
22. See generally Robert D. Truog, The Ethics of Organ Donation by Living Donors, 353 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 444 (2005).
23. Id. at 445.
24. Id.
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The concept of "directed donation" also has the potential for illegal
and unethical conduct by middlemen (brokers) and organ procure-
ment personnel at the behest of competitive organ transplant cen-
ters. 25 These latter individuals, who interview and secure consent
from vulnerable next of kin at the time of donation, are in a unique
position to influence the decision to donate and potentially to direct
the donation to a specific hospital, transplant program, or media-savvy
patient.
This new reality and threat to the equitable distribution of organs
from both living donors and brain dead cadavers has been addressed
as a matter of urgency by the United Network for Organ Sharing
(UNOS)-the private entity that, under a federal contract, adminis-
ters organ procurement and transplantation in the United States. 26 In
November 2004, UNOS issued a news release and a position state-
ment with regard to the public solicitation for directed donation from
deceased donors only.2 7 In essence, the statement contains language
that opposes the public solicitation for organs but leaves the onus on
the UNOS "member institution" to discourage this kind of activity-
specifically the transplant hospitals and organ procurement organiza-
tions in this country.28 The news release also announced the forma-
tion of a subcommittee to consider the matter further-particularly
the solicitation of living organ donors.29
In these future deliberations, UNOS might consider that directed
donations be allowed only for a number of unique circumstances.
These include carefully monitored, paired organ exchanges already in
place in some parts of the country, or situations where the potential
recipient is a family member of the donor. Altruistic organ donations
by strangers should be restricted solely to the pool of waiting patients
so as not to disadvantage those who have priority on medical grounds.
If directed donation is not restricted to these latter circumstances, fur-
ther chaos could result if, for instance, donations are dictated by the
religion or ethnicity of the potential recipient.
Finally, because Medicare and private health insurers foot the bill
for the procurement and eventual transplantation of the donated or-
25. Steve P. Calandrillo, Cash for Kidneys?: Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ
Shortage, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 89 (2004).
26. United Network for Organ Sharing, http://www.unos.org (last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
27. Press Release, United Network for Organ Sharing, OPTNIUNOS Board Opposes Solicita-
tion for Deceased Organ Donation (Nov. 19, 2004), available at http://www.unos.org/news/new-





gans,30 the public, health insurance policyholders, and 90,000 waiting
patients have a vital interest in the fair and equitable distribution of
donated vital organs-regardless of whether the donor is living or
deceased.31
Thus, in the short term, cadaver donors must provide the organs. A
recent study published in The New England Journal of Medicine sug-
gested that the potential pool of brain dead cadaver donors in the
United States varies from 10,500 to 13,800 per year-more than
enough to meet the demand for liver, lung, and heart transplants and
to make a sizeable impact on the kidney transplant waiting list.32
New strategies are urgently needed to ensure that all potential ca-
daver donors become actual organ donors. The public must be contin-
uously educated through campaigns similar to those that have been
used to promote the wearing of seatbelts in cars and the use of con-
doms to prevent HIV and AIDS. Similarly, professionals who have
unique opportunities to encourage organ donation-estate planners,
nurses, emergency and intensive care physicians-must be recruited
into the effort. In Spain, large, acute care hospitals have made donor
advisers available on site-a strategy that has markedly increased the
number of cadaver donors.33
In the long run, renewed efforts must be made to find acceptable
solutions to the dearth of donated human organs. So doing, desperate
patients will be given an equal opportunity to receive the gift of life
and benefit from the modern miracle of organ transplantation.
30. 42 C.F.R. § 482 (2004).
31. See James F. Childress, Ethical Criteria for Procuring and Distributing Organs for Trans-
plantation, 14 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 87 (1989).
32. See generally Ellen Sheehy et al., Estimating the Number of Potential Organ Donors in the
United States, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 667 (2003).
33. See generally George J. Chang et al., Expanding the Donor Pool: Can the Spanish Model
Work in the United States?, 3 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 1259, 1259-60 (2003); see also Rafael
Matesanz, Factors Influencing the Adaption of the Spanish Model of Organ Donation, 16 TRANS-
PLANT INT'L 736 (2003).
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